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The Aftermath of Agostini: Confusion Continues as the 
Modified Lemon Test is Applied in Helms v. Picard· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Helms v. Picard, 1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the 
modified Lemon test announced in Agostini v. F elton2 to reach a decision 
that falls short of what prudence dictates as necessary and academia will 
decry as improvident. In attempting to apply common sense to its Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence within the education context, the Supreme 
Court in Agostini found that presumptions relied on in the past when de-
ciding the role of public funding in the sphere of private schooling were 
incorrect. 1 The Court then reversed its reliance on such propositions and 
held that federally funded programs that provided supplemental remedial 
instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis were not invalid 
under the Establishment Clause when given in sectarian schools by gov-
ernment employees such as in the Agostini programs. 4 With the rejection 
of prejudicial presumptions and a recognition of both the professionalism 
and the law-abiding character of educators, Helms, a case that has been 
dragging its way through the court system for thirteen years, finally 
reached the promised land of resolution, at least on the Circuit Court level. 
Unfortunately, while Helms resolved an issue that had plagued sectar-
ian schools in the Jefferson Parish school district of Louisiana for thirteen 
years, it expanded and emphasized the confusion that still remains in Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence and direction within the educational en-
vironment context. This note will explore the reasoning utilized in ascer-
taining the constitutionality of an educational funding program in Louisi-
ana. This framework, while allowing the ability of public funds to be used 
within the private school context, did not extend to the providing of mate-
rials to a private school. The Supreme Court in the past has held that pro-
viding materials was unconstitutional in the private school context,5 and 
( 1975) 
* Coryright <D 1999 by Carlos Elizondo. 
I. 151 F.3d 347 (5'" Cir. 1998). 
2. 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997). 
3. See id. at 2015-16. 
4. See id. at 2016. 
5. See. e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 664 (1970); Meek v. Pettinger, 421 U.S. 349 
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reserved to itself the right to overturn previous cases that deal with similar 
issues raised using the analytical criteria developed in Agostini. Lower 
courts are not allowed to use this more current analysis to reach a decision, 
but instead must wait for the Supreme Court to overrule a specific case 
before applying the newly announced criteria for constitutionality to simi-
lar matters. 
This note is divided into five sections. The background section will 
give a brief outline of the development of the Lemon test6 and its applica-
tion in cases shortly after its announcement. In the facts section, the jour-
ney of Helms through the courts will be tracked as it was decided using the 
Lemon test. The reasoning section will introduce the determinations made 
by the Helms court in deciding the issues presented under the Agostini-
mandated modifications to the Lemon test. The analysis section will dis-
cuss the application of the modified test to Helms and the results that were 
reached there, as well as the questions that were left unresolved by the de-
cision. In the conclusion, this paper will comment on additional steps the 
Court will need to take when it chooses to intervene in this or a similar 
case in the future, as well as offer some suggestions on how best to take 
those steps in resolving questions left unanswered by Agostini and reem-
phasized in Helms. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Establishment clause jurisprudence as applied in the education envi-
ronment saw a major theme brought into its decision-making through 
Everson v. Board of Education1 in 1947. In Everson, the question arose as 
to whether the state could reimburse parents for transportation costs in-
curred in sending their children to attend a private sectarian school. The 
program established by the state allowed for the reimbursement for trans-
portation costs incurred while sending any child to school. The dissent ar-
gued that by providing reimbursement funds to parents of children attend-
ing a private religious school, the state in effect was supporting the estab-
lishment of a religion, and since this was prohibited by the Constitution, 
the legislative action should be found unconstitutional. Brought forth in 
this discussion was the quote attributed to Jefferson identifying the need to 
have a "wall of separation" between church and state. 8 The dissent asserted 
6. In determining the constitutionality of state action, the three-prong Lemon test requires 
first, that there be a valid, secular purpose to the legislation; second, that the legislation neither 
advances nor inhibits a religion; and third, that there be no excessive entanglement between the state 
and the religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 664 (1970). 
7. 330 U.S. I ( 1947) 
8. See 1d. at 16. 
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that this reimbursement scheme was an attempt to breach that wall. The 
Court recognized that in this instance the state was being evenhanded in its 
reimbursement scheme to parents of children who needed transportation to 
school. 9 The individual choice made by parents to send their children to a 
private school was not the same as forcing parents to send their children to 
a private school. 10 However, the court also incorporated a controlling phi-
losophy geared toward recognizing this "wall of separation." 
The Everson decision evidenced the coercion analysis used by the 
Court in early establishment jurisprudence. This methodology was a coer-
cion analysis 11 and used the principle that "[g]ovemment must have co-
erced or compelled an individual to religious practice or belief for a consti-
tutional violation to have occurred."12 Shortly after Everson, the Court de-
cided McCollum v. Board of Education, 13 a case where the public schools 
allowed students, with parental permission, to attend religious classes con-
ducted on the school premises during the school day. The Court found that 
the power of the state was used to force the student to attend religious in-
struction, and thus was unconstitutional. The Court seemed to be drawing 
a line of demarcation in determining the bounds of religious instruction 
occurring on public school property. 
This line was clarified in Zorach v. Clauson, 14 where students, with 
parental permission, were allowed to leave the school campus to attend 
religious instruction off campus. The Court recognized this as a proper 
accommodation of the free exercise clause, and not as the state coercing an 
individual to attend religious instruction. Justice Black, in his dissenting 
opinion, did not see a difference between having the religious education on 
the campus as in McCollum and releasing the student to attend classes off 
campus. 15 Justice Jackson, in a separate dissenting opinion of the same 
case, insisted that there was evidence of coercion in this situation. He saw 
that the student was forced to be in school by the state, and thus the ma-
chinery of the state was utilized to force the child to go to Church as well, 
if he wished to be released from public school activity during the day. 16 
However, in this decision, it is clear that the majority of the Court was per-
suaded that the proper role of the state, while doing nothing to either en-
courage or inhibit religious instruction or belief, was to accommodate the 
9. See id. at 16-17. 
10. See id. at 18. 
11. See Kristin J. Graham, The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the 
Touchstone of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 148 (1994). 
12. /d. at 149. 
13. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
14. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
15. See id. at 316. 
16. /d. at 323. 
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beliefs of those individuals who wished to receive religious instruction 
outside of the context of a public school setting. 
The Court's point of view, for the state to do nothing to either encour-
age or inhibit religious belief in the education sphere, led to the rejection 
of the coercion analysis by the Court in the early 1960's, as evidenced by 
the reasoning offered in Engle v. Vitale. This particular case raised the is-
sue of a daily prayer in the classrooms of public schools in New York. 
This "offering of a prayer" was defined as a religious activity (note that 
this is not religious instruction) and, as a religious activity in a public 
school, was found unconstitutional even without any evidence of coercion 
to participate in the prayer. 17 The Court went further by defining a reli-
gious activity as "reading the [B]ible or reciting the Lords Prayer." 1s In 
Schempp we are also introduced to what would eventually become the first 
two prongs of the Lemon test. 19 As proscribed by the Court, "to withstand 
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legisla-
tive purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion."20 The third prong of the Lemon test, that there be no excessive en-
tanglement between church and state, comes out of Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion.21 Rejection of coercion as a factor to consider when deciding consti-
tutionality of a state action is completed as the Court finally replaces this 
methodology with the Lemon test22 and its basis in activity, real or per-
ceived. 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 23 the Court again addressed the appropriate-
ness of providing public monies to a private school. This case involved 
two state legislative actions, one to subsidize the salaries of teachers in a 
private school setting, and another to reimburse private schools for the pur-
chase of instructional materials used in the teaching of students. The three 
prongs of the Lemon test as enunciated by the Supreme Court are "first, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... 
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement 
with religion."24 In applying this rule, the Court found that the actions pro-
mulgated by the state legislature were unconstitutional in two ways. First, 
the state was paying for teachers in a sectarian environment, which was 
aiding or supporting a religion and thus ran counter to the second prong of 
17. See id. 
18. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S 203 (1963) 
19. See William W. Van Alstyne, What is "An Establishment of Relil{ion" "· 65 N.C. L REV 
909 (1987) 
20. Supra note 18, at 222. 
21. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); See Alstyne, supra note 19, at 909. 
22. See Graham, supra note II. 
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
24. /d. at 612-13 (citations omitted). 
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the test as identified. Second, in the supervision of the teacher subsidy, as 
well as in the materials that were used and the auditing of the funds ex-
pended for these materials, there was an excessive entanglement between 
the Church and State, which was counter to the third prong of the test. 
Thus, the Court had established some guidelines that, while easy to 
describe, proved difficult to define and apply. This can be seen in Florey v. 
Sioux Falls School District 49-5, 25 where the court found that a school 
board policy that permitted the observance of holidays having both a reli-
gious and secular basis was not the prohibited advancement or establish-
ment of religion. The court in this decision went on to state that "[t]he First 
Amendment does not forbid all mention of religion in public schools; it is 
the advancement or inhibition of religion that is prohibited."26 Often, how-
ever, decisions by courts have forced school districts to prohibit any per-
sonal observation of religious expression or belief by a teacher or school 
administrator as a forbidden establishment of religion. 27 
More difficult are cases such as Wallace v. Jaffree, 28 given by the 
Court in 1984. In this case, the Alabama State legislature, in an attempt to 
allow students a choice of either meditation or prayer by allowing for a 
moment of silence to begin the school day, was rebuffed as attempting to 
establish a religion on the part of the state. This difficulty was highlighted 
in a strident dissenting opinion offered by Justice Rehnquist, as he fol-
lowed the case history of establishment jurisprudence as defined by Court 
decisions since Everson, and noted how the premises of the majority were 
a misapplication of Jefferson's commentary.29 He further commented that 
decisions based on the Lemon test were an abandonment of the common 
sense and pragmatic decision-making that should be the hallmark of the 
Court. 30 
The Wallace case was followed by Lee v. Weisman 31 in 1991. This 
case re-visited the offering of a prayer in a public school. However, this 
prayer was given by clergy invited to participate at a high school gradua-
tion ceremony. The Court found that this practice ran afoul of two prongs 
of the Lemon test. First, by extending an invitation to a clergy member, the 
governmental agency, in this instance the public school, was endorsing a 
religion. 32 Second, by providing a booklet of guidelines to the invited 
clergy in the preparation of a prayer, there was control over a representa-
25. 619 F.2d 1311 (1979). 
26. /d. at 1315 (1979) (citations omitted). 
27. E.g, policies by school districts prohibiting teachers from having a bible on their desk 
and changing the traditional "Christmas break" to the "Winter break". 
28. 472 U.S. 38 (1984). 
29. See id. at 90. 
30. See id. at 113. 
31. 505 U.S. 577 (1991). 
32. See id. at 585. 
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tive of a church, and thus an excessive government entanglementY In a 
scathing dissenting opinion authored by Justice Scalia, and joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Thomas, the theme of the his-
toricity of establishment clause jurisprudence and the resulting confusion 
that followed among lower courts, and in the Supreme Court, in their at-
tempts to apply the Lemon test since its development and announcement 
was continued. 
These two cases illustrate the Supreme Court's restrictions on religious 
expression and teaching in the public school sphere. They show that, even 
within the public school context, the influence upon private schools when 
a state takes some action to help all school-aged children is different. How-
ever, when the state begins to limit the benefits given to schools because of 
their religious nature, there are considerations regarding the constitutional 
prohibition against the establishment of a religion. It is the historical con-
text, and its mis-characterization to deny any recognition of a religious her-
itage, however, that is the focus of Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in 
Wallace, and Justice Scalia in his dissent in Lee. It is the effects of this 
recognition and the proposed neutrality that have been the philosophy of 
the Court that will be addressed in the discussion that follows. 
III. FACTS 
In the original Helms litigation, the district court used the analysis in 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Districf4 to rule that the special edu-
cation program as applied in the Jefferson Parish Public School System 
(JPPSS) was unconstitutional. In the Zobrest decision, the Supreme 
Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar a school district from 
providing an exceptional child with a sign-language interpreter at a sectar-
ian school "in order to facilitate his education."35 The district court in 
Helms then asked whether the Louisiana special education program was 
one that resembled a school aid program found constitutional or if it more 
closely resembled a school aid program that had been ruled unconstitu-
tional.36 
At issue were state statutes that defined and implemented two pro-
grams. These two programs dealt with the funding of special education 
programs to public and private schools and the providing of educational 
materials to public and private schools through the use of block grants ad-
ministered through state and local administrative agencies. 
33. See id. at 588. 
34. 509 U.S. I ( !993). 
35. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 355 (1998) (citation omitted). 
36. See id. 
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The first program the court addressed related to the funding provided 
for the provision of special education teachers and materials in public and 
private schools. The statutes that established this program were challenged 
as to their application in the private school context on the basis of support-
ing a religious institution. The teachers in the private schools were em-
ployed by an outside, independent agency, which contracted with the pri-
vate school to provide the instruction required by the state statute. The 
funds used to pay for these programs were a combination of state and local 
funds. The program was questioned because state funds were going to sup-
port instruction, albeit remedial instruction, on the premises of a private, 
sectarian school. The objection was whether state funds should be used to 
provide any instruction within a sectarian school context. Also questioned 
under this statute was the provision of materials within the special educa-
tion context. Again, the question concerned the appropriateness of using 
state aid to fund programs taking place within the premises of a private, 
sectarian school. 
The second program dealt with the funding of materials for use within 
the school itself, and was not confined to the special education context. 
These materials were not textbooks but included library materials, tape 
recorders, film projectors and the Iike.37 This program was the State of Lou-
isiana's implementation of Chapter 2 provisions of federal education pro-
grams.38 
The district court ultimately found that the programs had the imper-
missible effect of advancing religion and, because of the necessary moni-
toring to attempt to avoid such an effect, would result in an excessive en-
tanglement between the church and state. 39 This was precisely the type of 
reasoning that Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. 
Jaffree, had found so unreasonable.40 The original Helms court further 
found that the employment contracts made with the public school teachers, 
while independent of the sectarian school's control, as a combination of 
State and Special Education Services Corporation (SESC) funds 
"amounted to assistance ... given directly to the school themselves, and 
not [given] indirectly through the parents or students."41 In accordance 
with these findings, the district court held the programs as administered by 
the JPPSS unconstitutional. The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 
Having been in the courts for over thirteen years, Helms v. Picard had 
seen the landscape of establishment jurisprudence change dramatically.42 It 
37. See Helms, 151 F.3d at 367. 
38. See id. 
39. /d. at 350. 
40. See 472 U.S. 38, 109 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist, dissenting). 
41. Helms, 151 F.3d at 355 (citations omitted). 
42. See 151 F.3d 347 (1998). 
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was this dramatic change that led to the Agostini decision in 1997, as the 
Supreme Court there rejected three key assumptions used in applying the 
Lemon test in prior cases.43 Previous to the Agostini decision, the Court 
had presumed that 
(i) any public employee who works on a religious school's pre-
mises is presumed to inculcate religion in her work ... ; (ii) the 
presence of public employees on private school premises cre-
ates an impermissible symbolic union between church and 
state ... ; and , (iii) any public aid that directly aids the educa-
tional function of religious schools impermissibly finances 
religious indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as 
a consequence of private decision-making.44 
The Court had now, by its decision in Angostini, rejected these pre-
sumptions. The appeals court in Helms also noted a fourth premise re-
jected by the Comt in Agostini: that in Aguilar v. Felton,45 there was "an 
excessive entanglement with religion because public employees who teach 
on the premises of religious schools must be closely monitored to ensure 
that they do not inculcate religion."46 
Applying these changes allowed the circuit court in Helms to reverse 
the lower court's decision regarding the first program questioned about the 
employment of special education teachers to work on private school pre-
mises. This also allowed the provision of special education materials to be 
found constitutional as well. However, in applying the criteria to the sec-
ond program in question (the loaning of materials to the school in general), 
the circuit court affirmed the decision of the lower court. As will be dis-
cussed in the next section, it is this affirmation of the lower court decision 
that continues the confusion of establishment clause direction in the pri-
vate school setting. 
IV. REASONING 
The circuit court in Helms noted that even with the rejection of the 
presumptions as detailed in Agostini, the Court was "somewhat cryptic" 
regarding how to distinguish between valid and invalid government aid to 
sectarian schools.47 However, the appeals court in Helms did establish 
43. See, e.g., School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
44. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2001 (1997) (cites omitted) 
45. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
46. Helms, 151 F.3d at 357 (citations omitted). 
47. See id. at 358. 
409] THE AFTERMATH OF AGOSTINI 417 
three requirements that might be demanded before finding that the aid was 
constitutionally valid. 48 These requirements were that the aid be neutral 
(made available without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted); that the money go to reli-
gious institutions only as a result of genuinely independent and private 
choices of individuals; and finally, that the aid not indirectly finance a reli-
gious education by relieving the sectarian school of costs it would other-
wise have to bear in educating its students.49 
With these guiding criteria in mind, the Fifth Circuit Court addressed 
the main issues of the Helms appeal. The court then applied the Lemon test 
modifications to the district courts findings and rulings. The Fifth Circuit 
reversed the lower court's decision with regards to the constitutionality of 
the statute as passed by the state legislature regarding the special education 
program. The court found that the school district's implementation of Title 
1, Chapter 2, however, was unconstitutional. The appeals court affirmed 
the constitutionality of allowing public funds to be used in a private school 
setting when in pursuit of a legitimate secular objective. However, the cir-
cuit court would not extend the reasoning of the Supreme Court defined in 
Agostini to the provision of instructional materials, although the reasoning 
and the test criteria defined and utilized in overturning the first part of the 
decision would also apply to this matter. Rather, the court followed a pre-
vious ruling to hold that materials were not included in the aid that the 
state could provide to a private school. 
In finding the statute providing for the instruction of exceptional stu-
dents itself constitutional, yet determining that the provision concerning 
instructional materials was unconstitutional, the court relied on Meek v. 
Pettinger. 50 It is the Helms court's reliance on Meek that leads to the con-
tinuing confusion in the direction given by the Supreme Court when exam-
ining establishment clause arguments. This resulting confusion is expected 
when looking at the presumptions that the Supreme Court rejected when 
modifying the Lemon test in Agostini. Among those presumptions now 
rejected was that "any public aid that directly aids the educational function 
of religious schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even 
if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private decision-mak-
ing."51 Now it is necessary to show that the aid provided does not diminish 
the costs that the private school would normally incur in its providing of 
an education. However, in defining the new analytical criteria, yet denying 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
50. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) 
51. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S Ct. 1997, 2001 (1997). 
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their use when appropriate, the Supreme Court continues the lack of clear 
direction that the lower courts rely upon. 
In Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District,52 a California case 
decided about two years before Agostini, the Ninth Circuit looked to Meek 
as well. The Walker court found that the analysis used in other Supreme 
Court cases allowed it to conclude that state aid could extend to the provi-
sion of instructional materials. 53 Moreover, the Walker court followed an 
analysis similar to that used by the Supreme Court in Agostini to find that 
Meek's direction was no longer valid. However, by adhering to the direc-
tion given in Agostini to follow previous cases on point, a different deci-
sion by the Helms court was reached as compared to the Walker court. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Helms court made its determination regarding the constitutionality 
of the statutory provisions enacted by the Louisiana State legislature by 
looking not only at Agostini, but also reviewing the decisions that were 
over-turned in School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Bal/54 and 
Aguilar v. F elton55 to define the parameters of their decisional analysis. As 
the court noted, "Agostini is as important for what it did not hold as for 
what it did."56 The court found that the Supreme Court had overruled only 
part of the analysis in Ball as it found one of the two programs in question 
unconstitutional because of the premises governing that analysis. The 
Helms court concluded that the other aspect of the Ball analysis, which 
was not overturned, was still valid. 57 
After reviewing the aspects of Ball and Aguilar that were still valid, 
the Helms court concluded that there were several key items still useful in 
any analysis. Among these were "(I) 'the character and purposes of the 
institutions benefitted,' (2) 'the nature of the aid that the State provides,' 
and, (3) 'the resulting relationship between the government and religious 
authority.' "58 These factors were examined to determine the status of the 
teacher who provided the services required by the statute in question and 
the extent of control exercised by the sectarian school authorities over that 
teacher. 
The purpose of the Louisiana statute in question was to "assure and 
require that the state shall fund a program of special education and related 
52. 46 F.3d 1449 (1995). 
53. See id. at 1465. 
54. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
55. 473 U S. 402 (1985) 
56. Helms, 151 F3d at 360. 
57 See id. 
58 !d. at 359. 
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services for the exceptional children of the state."59 The Helms court found 
nothing on the face of the statute to detract from the Legislature's secular 
goals in enacting it. 60 The funding was evenhandedly distributed to the in-
dividual schools. The schools did not have the statutory obligation to pro-
vide remedial instructions; rather, remedial instruction was an aspect of the 
educational sphere that the state had chosen to undertake itself. Looking 
further into the statue, the Helms court found that it was designed to pro-
vide equal educational opportunities to all students, regardless of their 
"national origin, sex, economic status, race, religion, physical or mental 
handicap or any other exceptionalities."61 As such, the neutral provisions 
in the statute were directed toward a valid secular legislative purpose, and 
thus met the first prong of the Lemon test. 
This analysis and the conclusion reached are interesting because they 
run counter to the analysis the Supreme Court had utilized in determining 
the unconstitutionality of the statute at issue in Wallace v. Jaffree. 62 There, 
the Court looked beyond the face of the statute, focusing only on one 
phrase of the state statute to the exclusion of the entire force and intent of 
the statute to determine whether it was valid on its face. The Court there 
also used statements made over a year after the passage of the statute to 
determine its intent.63 The Helms court, on the other hand, looked at the 
entire purpose of the statute in question to determine the complete effect of 
the legislation. Moreover, the Helms court was applying the modified 
Lemon test, with its rejected presumptions, to a case addressing funding 
issues in a private school context. Thus, in finding the remedial program 
and its funding constitutional, the Helms court not only looked at the en-
tirety of the case, but used a lens unencumbered by the prejudicial pre-
sumptions of previous jurisprudence. The Helms court seemed to take to 
heart the direction of the Court to be reluctant to attribute "unconstitutional 
motives to the State" as they sought to find a "plausible secular purpose 
for the states program [that could] be discerned from the face of the stat-
ute."64 
Regarding the status of the public teacher employed and working in 
the sectarian school environment, the Helms court expressed some discom-
fort with the shared control that the local school district had over the pub-
lic employee.65 However, the court determined that this contact was suffi-
ciently minimal, and that the state retained substantial control over the 
59. Helms, 151 F.3d at 363 (citation omitted). 
60. See id. 
61. /d. 
62. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
63. See id. at 86 (Burger, C.J. dissenting). 
64. Helms, 151 F.3d at 363 (1998) (citation omitted). 
65. See id. at 364. 
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conduct and content of the public employee to the extent that there was no 
constitutional conflict. More importantly, since the key presumptions of 
the Lemon test previously identified were now rejected, the court did not 
have to labor long over the issue of the extent of monitoring necessary nor 
the actual content of the remedial help provided to find that it also passed 
constitutional muster. 
In considering the next issue raised on appeal, the loaning of instruc-
tional materials bought with state funds into the sectarian school environ-
ment, the analysis of the court took an interesting turn. First, the Helms 
comt reviewed the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 and its counterpart in the Louisiana stat-
utes. Then the court noted that the district court had used an analysis simi-
lar to that used in Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District66 to 
conclude that the implement1tion of the Act was constitutional as per-
formed in that school district. The review of the steps followed by the dis-
trict court in the original Helms litigation showed that the Walker method-
ology was used to determine whether the funding program, as applied to 
school materials in Louisiana, was constitutional. The Walker court used 
Supreme Court analytical methodology to extend constitutional legitimacy 
to providing aid in the form of instructional materials to private sectarian 
schools. The Walker court reasoned that since the Court had found consti-
tutional the State's ability to provide testing materials to a private school, 
as well as grading such tests, then the logical extension was that other ma-
terial for classroom use could also be provided.67 The Helms court ob-
served, however, the dissenting opinion given by Judge Fernandez in 
Walker. While agreeing with the analysis utilized, Judge Fernandez be-
lieved that Meek was still binding law. 68 As he noted in the dissent, "[t]he 
Supreme Court has given us the book-for-kids versus materials-for-kids 
dichotomy. Only it can take it away."69 
The Helms court, although following Agostini, examined more care-
fully the reasoning in Wolman v. Walter70 as used by the Walker court, but 
reached a different conclusion. The Helms court found that it was insuffi-
cient to look only at the amount of aid given; one also had to examine the 
character of the aid used to determine its constitutionality.71 With this prin-
ciple as a guide, the Helms court concluded that the testing program was 
not a program the school would have to provide. The Helms court con-
cluded that the State was the entity requiring the measurement that would 
66. 46 F.3d 1449 (1995). 
67. See id. at 1455 (citations omitted). 
68. See Helms, 151 F.3d at 371. 
69. !d. See also Walker, supra note 52. 
70. 433 U.S. 229 (1977) 
71. See Helms, 151 F.3d at 372. 
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be obtained by the testing, and the information was for the benefit of the 
state. With these findings, there was no difficulty in finding this aid consti-
tutional. The Helms court continued in its reasoning to determine that this 
was fundamentally a different type of aid as compared to providing aid in 
the form of library books, video tape machines, recorders and other types 
of instructional materials.72 This conclusion becomes difficult to reconcile 
given the stated objective of the Louisiana statute to provide materials to 
all students in whatever school district they happen to be enrolled. The 
state has granted to parents the right to choose where to educate their chil-
dren, so long as state requirements regarding the instruction provided are 
met. 
However, the Helms court was relying on the Agostini decision and 
discussion. In Agostini, the Supreme Court had stated that "if a precedent 
of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons 
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should fol-
low the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court [the Supreme 
Court] the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."73 Thus, the court 
found unconstitutional the provision of instructional materials as imple-
mented under Title 1, Chapter 2 by the JPPSS as per the holding found in 
Meek. 
What this decision does, however, is establish a conflict in the lower 
courts with regards to the extent of the reasoning as described in Wolman 
when brought up against the reasoning in Agostini. The Walker court had 
found that the Supreme Court, in reaffirming Meek's holding in Wolman, 
had undermined the rational of Meek sufficient to extend the kinds of aid 
benefits available to sectarian schools to include instructional materials.74 
Helms, however, found just the opposite conclusion. In contrast, there is 
an indication that the Helms court's application of the Agostini analysis to 
its question may have resulted in the same conclusion as the Walker court. 
Apparently the Helms court felt compelled to stay within the parameters 
strictly laid down by the Supreme Court. Indeed, when reviewing the in-
struction that the Court gave in the Agostini decision regarding other cases, 
it becomes clear that the Court was anticipating more discussion and deci-
sions in the field of establishment jurisprudence to come before it. 75 
With this split in conclusions now evidenced using an analysis defined 
and applied by the Supreme Court in Agostini, there are several factors that 
the Court should bear in mind as it prepares to consider cases that will in-
evitably come before it. First and foremost, the Court must not only clearly 
72. See id. 
73. !d. 
74. See Walker, supra note 52 at 1465. 
75. As evidenced by the Court's reiteration of reserving the "prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions" Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct 1997, 2017 (citations omitted). 
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define the decision it renders, but must allow its reasoning, once defined, 
to be utilized in related cases. Second, the Court will have to act quickly to 
prevent further splintering among the various appeals courts, especially 
given the common sense rationality of the Agostini-made changes to the 
Lemon test. And last, the Court should adhere to the common-sense ap-
proach it appears to be taking with regards to establishment clause juris-
prudence in the educational sphere by recognizing a more complete histor-
ical context of foundational constitutional principles. 
In Agostini, the Court tried to limit the extent of the changes it was 
announcing by inserting a comment about the Court's intent to reserve for 
itself the prerogative of overturning its own previous decisions. 76 This may 
have been a response to the decision by Walker and its analysis to find the 
provision of instructional material permissible; unfortunately, all this ac-
complished was to provide tools for the lower courts to use, but then not 
allow their use. However, the direction and analytic tools defined in 
Agostini are necessary to bring some coherence to a body of decisions that 
need some sense of orderliness. 
The Court needs to not only create clear analytical tools and direction 
by decision, it must allow the use of the tools it creates to resolve conflicts 
as they appear in the lower courts. As the dissenting opinions in Wallace v. 
Jaffree and Lee v. Weisman make abundantly clear, the confusion in the 
lower courts, and thus the disparity among their decisions, is a direct result 
of the unclear direction from the Supreme Court itself when deciding cases 
before the Court. This confusion is aggravated by the misapplication of 
historical context in attempting to resolve the disputes of today. Refusing 
to use clearer direction for lower court decision making can only result in 
an increase in that confusion. 
Further, the Supreme Court must accept jurisdiction to hear several 
cases that deal with the issues that need resolution to quickly overturn 
other Establishment Clause precedent of recent years, and thus diminish 
the recurring tide of confusion that continues to occur but which can easily 
be extinguished. In the dissenting opinion of Agostini, Justice Ginsberg 
noted that it would be better to get a vehicle more in keeping with the pre-
cedents it is seeking to overturn.77 Justice Ginsberg's most stinging com-
mentary was regarding the fact that the issue before the Supreme Court in 
Agostini was for relief sought under rules of procedure, and not a case that 
dealt with live issues currently in conflict and properly before the Court. 78 
With the disparate decisions in Walker and Helms, Justice Ginsberg may 
very well get her wish. 
76. See Agostini, 117 S.Ct at 2017. 
77. See id. at 2029. 
78. See id. at 2026. 
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Finally, the Court needs to remember its difficult role. Its role should 
be to resolve conflicts that come before it, recognize the practical guidance 
that the lower courts rely on to administer the judicial direction that the 
Court gives, and refrain from refereeing changing societal mores by con-
sidering extreme positions of possibility in the conflicts it is asked to adju-
dicate. In the past, the Court has shown wisdom born of practicality in its 
decisions as previous members of the Court have sought to answer the 
problems of their day with directness and simplicity. The same could be 
said for the Supreme Court of today as it applies its collective wisdom to 
resolving the conflicts of today with similar directness and simplicity. 
In attempting to reign in the confusion inherent in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence as it now exists, the Supreme Court will need to re-
flect on the foundational principles of free exercise according to the indi-
vidual dictates of the conscience. More importantly, the Court will need to 
step back from its blind application of rules it has established for decision 
making and look to the reasons for the inclusion of the specific amend-
ments when originally accepted. Much is to be learned from the applica-
tion of restraints on the state, but more importantly, restraints on the fed-
eral government, as pointed out by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting 
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree. 79 
Of note is the historical context of the First Amendment, and the re-
straints that were envisioned by the founders on the federal government to 
coerce religious practice and support. As one looks at the evils that the 
amendment was designed to overcome, Justice Rehnquist argues that it 
becomes quite clear that the underlying principles deal more with preserv-
ing individual liberties against coercion by the state to belief in a particular 
manner or to support a particular religious sect. 80 There is no restraint on 
the ability of the state to accommodate, and even support a general reli-
gious heritage. This, of course, is at odds with Supreme Court opinions 
going back even before Everson, where the Establishment Clause has been 
defined as meaning neither advancing nor inhibiting religious belief in any 
way. It is adherence to this underlying premise that has led to the creation 
of a wholesome neutrality in Establishment Clause jurisprudence that, in 
reality, is not neutrality toward religion, but rather exorcism of religion and 
religious belief from the public sphere. This is a presumption that is best 
quickly overturned, for as Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree and Jus-
tice Scalia in Lee v. Weisman point out, the heritage of the founding fa-
thers is a deeply held religious belief that extended to their public pro-
nouncements and actions. 81 The fear of the founding fathers in adding the 
79. 472 U.S. 38, 91-112 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist, dissenting). 
80. See id. at 99-100. 
81. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577. 
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First Amendment was not to prohibit the governmental recognition of reli-
gion in the public sphere, but rather a fear that individuals would enter 
government and then prescribe only one religious pattern of worship to the 
exclusion of any other. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Helms v. Picard, we were treated to a close look at the application 
of the modified Lemon test toward questions of the applicability of the Es-
tablishment Clause to the private education sphere. In allowing for a more 
common-sense approach and result based on the rejection of patently prej-
udiced presumptions, the Court has taken a small step toward restraining 
the state and federal governments from inhibiting the development of a 
religious heritage. Recent judicial neutrality has been skewed toward no 
reference or regard for religion, either as an institution or a creed of be-
liefs, in the educational sphere of judicial discussion. While previous Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence attempted to prohibit the endorsement of 
any religion, most cases have overreached when insisting on no acknowl-
edgment of religion, either as a government or an individual in a govern-
mental capacity. To disallow recognition of the religious heritage of this 
country is not neutrality, but exorcism. 
By limiting the lower courts in how to apply the modified Lemon test 
analysis, the Supreme Court has allowed confusing criteria for deciding 
questions of state aid to private schools. While the Helms court found one 
statute in Louisiana was valid, it held as unconstitutional a second statute 
that attempted to give aid to all the schools in the state without regard to 
the school's status as public or private. We are then left, while not in the 
same place we were before the modification, not much further along in 
allowing the state to serve all of its citizens, whether they have a belief in a 
Supreme Being or not. 
In the Supreme Court's attempts to constrain governmental recogni-
tion of religious expression and sever any recognition of religiosity by the 
state for fear of endorsement or establishment within the context of the 
educational environment, the Court has turned its back on the contribu-
tions of those who believe in a Supreme Being. The Court, instead, seems 
to favor those who promote beliefs that are not religious or even irreli-
gious. In exorcizing the religious heritage of the general public from the 
public school and, in effect, from the public morality, the Court has been 
on a crusade to displace the majority respect of religion and belief with the 
minority disregard of religious faith. The promise to protect the rights of 
631 (1992) 
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the minority in the face of the majority does not mean displacing the ma-
jority view with the minority view. The more reasonable assumption is to 
allow both views to exist, not at the expense of either, but to the benefit of 
both. 
In attempting to allow public monies to be used for the benefit of all 
citizens, the Court has sought to remember the evils that are possible by 
misplaced or misguided zealous adherence to a religious belief. Thus, the 
debate of establishment of religion has become based on a fear of atrocities 
rendered in the past, rather than a recognition of the positive morality 
available for the future. This led the Court to begin a crusade of extreme-
ness against any religious recognition. In taking a step toward rectifying its 
own zealous adherence to what seems to be an erroneous constitutional 
creed, the Supreme Court has shown that wisdom is not in short supply 
among its members today as it remembers its role as a pragmatic decision-
maker relying on basic foundational constitutional principles in rendering 
its decisions. 
Carlos Elizondo 
